Matthew Feldman Returns to Willkie after Serving as Chief Legal Advisor to Treasury’s Automobile Advisory Team
November 9, 2009 by
Filed under News
NEW YORK–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP today announced that Matthew A. Feldman has rejoined the firm after serving as the Chief Legal Advisor to the Obama administration’s Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry. Mr. Feldman was recruited to join the Auto Team at the United States Treasury to help develop the overall strategy to restructure and recapitalize General Motors Corporation and Chrysler LLC, a strategy which resulted in the ground breaking legal proceedi
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Matthew Feldman Returns to Willkie after Serving as Chief Legal Advisor to Treasury’s Automobile Advisory Team
AlixPartners Client ‘Old GM’ Announces Agreement to Sell First Major Asset
October 27, 2009 by
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WILMINGTON, Del.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–AlixPartners LLP, the global business-advisory firm that since last December worked to help keep General Motors Corp. away from a freefall bankruptcy and that since July has managed the estate of “Old GM” (Motors Liquidation Co.), today commented on the announcement that MLC has signed a letter of intent to complete its first major asset sale: the sale of a former GM assembly plant in Wilmington, Del., to premium carmaker Fisker Automotive Inc. of I
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AlixPartners Client ‘Old GM’ Announces Agreement to Sell First Major Asset
Learn Lessons from GM and Chrysler
May 29, 2009 by Allison Davis
Filed under Blog
A new Chrysler may be emerging just a GM slips into bankruptcy. Chrysler’s experience has been extraordinary: it is going through a smoother, faster bankruptcy with the federal government playing the unprecedented role of both task-master and mediator.
GM is not Chrysler: GM is far larger and more complex. Still, the Chrysler experience should be cause for some optimism that GM’s experience will be similarly efficient.
What other lessons can GM take from Chrysler’s experience?
1/ Consumers will do business with a bankrupt brand. Prevailing wisdom was that with a major purchase (like a vehicle) consumers would avoid the risk of buying from a company in bankruptcy.
Edmunds.com data shows that not to be the case. Consumer sales share dipped in April before bankruptcy was filed, but has rebounded since. Clearly, media coverage of a potential bankruptcy or liquidation does impact sales, but the stigma of being in bankruptcy seems to have been vastly overstated, with Chrysler consumer sales share back up to January levels for the month of May.
Changes in share of Industry Purchase Intent vs. baseline (the four weeks before the bankruptcy announcement—the all-time low for Chrysler):
| Week Ending | Chrysler LLC | Chrysler | Dodge | Jeep | ||||
| 5/3 | +12% | +24% | +9% | +6% | ||||
| (Bankruptcy announcement) | ||||||||
| 5/10 | +27% | +51% | +21% | +21% | ||||
| (New incentives announcement) | ||||||||
| 5/17 | +27% | +49% | +20% | +23% | ||||
|
5/24 |
+72% | +141% | +56% | +58% |
2/ Consumers aren’t as familiar with brands as one might think. The pattern where sales share drops pre-bankruptcy and climbs during is most pronounced for Chrysler Division vehicles, less so for Dodge division and almost not notable for Jeep division. Clearly consumers aren’t keeping tabs on which vehicle brands are owned by which automaker.
This could be good news for GM, whose divisions will most likely parallel the experience of Dodge and Jeep; not Chrysler division. (The exceptions being Saturn, Hummer and Pontiac where sales or shutdown have been covered extensively.)
Changes in share of industry purchase intent vs. April average:
| Week Ending | GM | Hummer | Pontiac | Saturn | ||||
| 5/3 | -1% | +7% | +26% | -8% | ||||
| 5/10 | -6% | -8% | -13% | -16% | ||||
| 5/17 | -9% | -14% | -18% | -15% | ||||
| 5/24 | -6% | -6% | -5% | -17% |
3/ Consumers will have questions and want answers. Chrysler invested heavily in a brand marketing campaign immediately after filing. Edmunds.com CEO Jeremy Anwyl feels that may have been premature. “Like a salmon swimming upstream, Chrysler’s lofty paid messages ran counter to a heavy flow of news reports covering bankruptcy. The messages appeared tone deaf, or just were ignored.”
Consumers do have real questions about their dealer, their vehicle and the deals available in bankruptcy. Consumers flocked in record numbers to research these issues on the Internet; GM has the opportunity to proactively reach out and address these concerns head on.
4/ Consumers think that “bankruptcy” equals “deal.” One reason that sales have been strong for Chrysler is that bankruptcy has brought “deal-seekers” into their dealer’s showrooms.
During the bankruptcy process, Chrysler is terminating 789 dealers with little advanced notice. This created a situation where some dealers have been selling Chrysler vehicles at significant discounts. The below chart sets out month-by-month analysis of the dealer profit margin trend, comparing closing dealerships to the average:
|
Average Profit Margin Differential |
||||||
| Chrysler | Dodge | Jeep | ||||
| January 2009 | $610 | $830 | $710 | |||
| February 2009 | $115 | $1844 | $1112 | |||
| March 2009 | $679 | $725 | $311 | |||
| April 2009 | $828 | $888 | $354 | |||
| May 2009 | $2672 | $823 | $1204 | |||
5/ A deal is what a consumer thinks it is. Despite the terminated dealers selling vehicles at a unusually high discounted rate, overall profit margins for Chryslers dealers actually increased in May. How could this be? There is an intuitive logic around the idea that vehicles purchased from a bankrupt automaker must be a great deal. Consumers accepting this logic actually negotiate less aggressively and pricing trends up.
Instead of a brand campaign, GM would be well served to consider a bankruptcy sales event. This type of campaign would reinforce and build upon consumer beliefs – a highly efficient marketing strategy.
|
Average Transaction Price |
||||||||||
| Jan 2009 | Feb 2009 | Mar 2009 | April 2009 | May 2009 | ||||||
| Chrysler LLC | $29,046 | $28,278 | $28,504 | $28,650 | $28,288 | |||||
| Chrysler | $29,572 | $28,877 | $28,959 | $29,103 | $28,624 | |||||
| Dodge | $30,355 | $29,229 | $29,499 | $29,671 | $29,432 | |||||
| Jeep | $26,691 | $26,451 | $26,536 | $26,757 | $26,422 | |||||
|
Average Gross Profit per Vehicle |
||||||||||
| Jan 2009 | Feb 2009 | Mar 2009 | April 2009 | May 2009 | ||||||
| Chrysler LLC | $712 | $457 | $483 | $477 | $660 | |||||
| Chrysler | $538 | $322 | $358 | $420 | $662 | |||||
| Dodge | $915 | $587 | $623 | $630 | $776 | |||||
| Jeep | $488 | $332 | $316 | $269 | $487 | |||||

